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Abstract. We study simultaneous price drops of real stocks and show that for high drop thresholds they fol-
low a power-law distribution. To reproduce these collective downturns, we propose a minimal self-organized
model of cascade spreading based on a probabilistic response of the system elements to stress conditions.
This model is solvable using the theory of branching processes and the mean-ﬁeld approximation. For a
wide range of parameters, the system is in a critical state and displays a power-law cascade-size distribution
similar to the empirically observed one. We further generalize the model to reproduce volatility clustering
and other observed properties of real stocks.
1 Introduction
Cascade spreading is an important emergent property of
various complex systems. Real life examples of cascades
are numerous and range from infrastructure failures and
epidemics to traﬃc jams and cultural fads [1,2]. Theoret-
ical models of cascades usually assume that agents can
be in one of two states (healthy or failed) and an agent’s
failure puts some stress on its neighbors which may con-
sequently fail too. See [3] for a recent survey of this ﬁeld
oﬀering a novel unifying view.
In this paper we focus on cascades in economic sys-
tems which can be identiﬁed with stock prices suddenly
dropping in a major market crash [4] or with companies
going bankrupt simultaneously and leading to global re-
cession [5]. Theoretical models of such cascades are based
on shortage and bankruptcy propagation in production
networks [6], default propagation in credit networks [7,8],
interaction of ﬁrms through one monopolistic bank [9] or
in a complex credit network economy [10], and herding
behavior of traders [11,12]. While these models help us to
understand cascade processes in economic systems, they
are mostly too involved to allow for analytical solutions –
their study hence relies on numeric simulations and agent-
based modeling [13].
A simpler point of view on cascade phenomena is of-
fered by the concept of self-organized criticality (SOC)
which has had a deep impact on the science of complex-
ity. First introduced more than twenty years ago to ex-
plain the ubiquitous 1/f noise [14], it caused a blossoming
of toy models, computer simulations, and real life exper-
iments [15]. The analytical techniques employed include
scaling arguments [16], mean-ﬁeld theories [17], branch-
ing processes [18], renormalization methods [19,20], and
rigorous algebraical techniques [21].
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SOC is a mechanism which explains the emergence
of complex behavior in many diverse real world sys-
tems [22,23]. The generic behavior of SOC models is: (a)
they evolve so that they always stay close to the critical
point; (b) long periods of robustness and moderate activ-
ity are interrupted by sudden breakdowns. This qualita-
tively resembles “stock markets which expand and grow
on relatively long time scales but contract in stock-market
crashes on relatively short time scales” [15] and “stock
crashes caused by the slow buildup of long-range correla-
tion leading to a global cooperative behavior of the market
eventually ending into a collapse in a short time inter-
val” [4]. This similarity provides the main motivation for
the present study.
We begin our work with an empirical investigation of
simultaneous price drops of real stocks and show that the
size distribution of observed events is broad (for high drop
thresholds it follows a power-law distribution). This obser-
vation suggests that simultaneous stock downturns are a
collective phenomenon. We propose a simple dynamical
model which for a wide range of parameters self-organizes
into a critical state. Unlike most SOC models, our model
assumes a probabilistic response mechanism where a node
has only a certain probability of reacting to the current
stress conditions. The basic idea behind modeling simul-
taneous stock downturns with cascades is that decline of a
single stock may provoke investors’ reactions which conse-
quently may cause other stocks to decline and a “cascade”
to spread. The key premise is that while failed nodes be-
come signiﬁcantly more resistant in the next time step,
healthy nodes become slightly less resistant. This close
parallel with the slow growth/fast decay picture described
above is further supported by our analysis of empirical
data which shows that majority of stocks behave in this
way. While there are certainly many other eﬀects con-
tributing to the dynamics of market crashes (external
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shocks, for example), we show that failure propagation
alone can reproduce some of the observed patterns.
The minimal model proposed here has the advantage
of being simple, not relying on ﬁne-tuning of parameters,
analytically solvable in some cases, and easily generaliz-
able to more complicated settings. We analyze it using
the formalism of branching processes, the mean-ﬁeld ap-
proximation and, for complex topologies of nodes’ interac-
tions, using numerical simulations. Obtained cascade-size
distributions exhibit a close similarity to our empirical ob-
servations. Introduction of memory within the model al-
lows us to reproduce other empirically observed features,
such as volatility clustering, though at the cost of analyt-
ical tractability. We conclude our study with a discussion
of further model’s generalizations and possible areas of
application.
2 Empirical data
Here we investigate co-occurring price movements of real
stocks. Adopting the vocabulary of cascade models, we say
that a stock fails when the relative loss of its price over
a given time interval Δt exceeds a certain threshold H .
Denoting the price of stock i at time t as pi(t), its failure
occurs when [pi(t) − pi(t + Δt)]/pi(t) > H . The number
of stocks failing at time t, nF (t), is a direct analog of the
cascade size in a model of cascade spreading. As the input
data we use daily closing prices (hence Δt = 1day) of
500 stocks from the standard U.S. index S&P 500 (this
data is freely available at, for example, finance.yahoo.
com). To achieve a ﬁxed system size, we consider only those
332 companies which are in the stock market since the
beginning of 1992 and use their prices during the 18-years
long period ending in May 2010 for our analysis.
The empirical distribution of failure sizes is shown in
Figure 1 for H = 0% and H = 10%. We see that for
the large value of H (which is in line with the notion
of stock failures), the observed size distribution has a
power-law shape. Using the methodology described in [24],
we obtained the power-law exponent 2.19 ± 0.05 with
the lower bound for the power-law behavior nmin = 3.
The corresponding p-value (obtained using the standard
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic) is 0.92 which conﬁrms that
the data is consistent with the hypothesis of a power-law
distribution. Similar results are obtained also for other
threshold values so long as H  8%. When H  8%,
the resulting size distributions are broad but probably not
power-law. Finally, when H = 0% (i.e., any price drop is
interpreted as a failure), the size distribution is roughly
symmetric around the value corresponding to one half of
the system size (see Fig. 1). In the following analysis of
empirical data we use the threshold H = 10%.
The power-law shape itself suggests that the observed
simultaneous stock downturns are rather a collective phe-
nomenon than independent events. This hypothesis is fur-
ther supported by the average correlation of simultane-
ously failing stocks, 0.35 (again including only events
with at least three simultaneously failing stocks), which
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Fig. 1. (Color online) The empirical failure size distribution
observed with real stock prices (daily closing prices of 332 com-
panies from January 1992 until May 2010) for threshold rel-
ative drops H = 0% and H = 10%. The straight line corre-
sponds to the exponent 2.19 obtained by statistical analysis of
the data.
is signiﬁcantly higher than the overall average stock cor-
relation, 0.25. Another sign of a strong connection among
simultaneously failing stocks comes from their division to
ten diﬀerent industrial sectors according to the GICS clas-
siﬁcation. The eﬀective number of sectors participating in
a cascade is deﬁned as
e :=
(
10∑
i=1
r2i
)−1
(1)
where ri is the relative share of sector i in the cascade and∑10
i=1 ri = 1. By averaging this quantity over all cascades
of a given size S, we obtain e(S). This number can be com-
pared with the eﬀective number of sectors corresponding
to selecting failed stocks at random, e′(S). The analysis of
stock prices shows that for any S > 3, e(S) is signiﬁcantly
smaller than e′(S) which implies that simultaneous stock
failures preferentially aﬀect strongly connected stocks in
one sector or in a small number of sectors.
Now we turn our attention to time correlations of fail-
ures. The autocorrelation of the number of failing stocks
with the time lag one day, C(nF (t), nF (t + 1)) ≈ 0.15, is
comparable with the autocorrelation of absolute returns,
C(|r(t)|, |r(t + 1)|) ≈ 0.25 (the latter result agrees with
previous studies [25,26]). The positive autocorrelation val-
ues are signs of volatility clustering which is commonly ob-
served in ﬁnancial data [27]. (Loosely speaking, volatility
clustering means that large changes tend to be followed
by large changes and small changes tend to be followed by
small changes, as ﬁrst noted by Mandelbrot [28]).
We further estimate conditional failure probabilities
for individual stocks. For example, P (F |N) denotes fail-
ure probability of a stock given that this stock didn’t
fail in the previous time step (other three quantities,
P (N |F ), P (F |F ), and P (N |N), follow the same logic).
When the results are averaged over all stocks, we obtain
P (F |F ) = 0.039 which is much higher than the overall
failure probability P (F ) = 0.003 – this is another sign
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of volatility clustering in our data. On the level of indi-
vidual stocks, however, 62% of all stocks with at least
three failures strongly satisfy the inequality P (N |F ) >
P (N) which is equivalent to P (F |F ) < P (F ) (because
P (F |F ) + P (N |F ) = 1). (By strong satisfying we mean
that the diﬀerence of the two probabilities is greater than
the sum of their uncertainties). We see that despite volatil-
ity clustering in the data, most stocks are more “resistant”
to failures after they have just undergone one. For the
remaining stocks, probabilities P (N |F ) and P (N) either
diﬀer less than the sum of values’ uncertainties (for 14%
of stocks) or even strongly satisfy the opposite inequality
P (N |F ) < P (N), with corresponding values of P (F |F )
often as high as 0.30 (24% of stocks).
To summarize, after a failure (a major price drop),
most stocks become more resistant to another failure –
this observation will serve as a basis for the mathemati-
cal model presented in the following section. At the same
time, there is a fraction of stocks which are prone to con-
secutive failures – this particular feature will be discussed
in detail in Section 4.
3 Basic model and its mean-field solution
In this section we present a basic model which is amenable
to analytical treatment and qualitatively reproduces some
of the features observed in empirical data. In its original
formulation, this model is particularly suitable for stocks
that, as discussed in the previous section, after a failure
become more robust. A generalization of the model aiming
at reproducing other observed features (volatility cluster-
ing, for example) is presented in Section 4.
Consider a system of N nodes where node i (i =
1, . . . , N) has only two possible states: failed (i ∈ F) and
healthy (i ∈ F). With each node i we further associate
fragility fi ∈ [0, 1] which measures how this node reacts
to failures of its neighbors (the higher the fragility, the
more likely is the node to follow a neighbor’s failure). The
dynamics of the model is governed by the following sim-
ple rules. (i) In each time step, the ﬁrst failed node (“trig-
ger”) is chosen at random and may induce failures of other
nodes. (ii) If a neighbor of node i fails, node i follows it
with probability fi and resists with probability 1− fi. (If
several neighbors of node i fail simultaneously, in order
to stay healthy, node i has to resist each individual fail-
ure). The cascade of failures propagates until all remaining
nodes resist the damage. (iii) At the end of the time step,
fragilities of all nodes are updated according to
fi(t + 1) =
{
λfi(t) i ∈ F
(1 + β)fi(t) i ∈ F
(2)
where 0 < β  1 and λ ∈ (0, 1) are parameters of
the model (in eﬀect, failed nodes become less fragile and
healthy nodes become slightly more fragile in the next
time step). All values fi(t + 1) > 1 are truncated to 1
(this may occur when β is large). After this update is
ﬁnished, all nodes are again marked as healthy, the cur-
rent time step ends and a new one begins with point (i).
Note that unlike some other models of cascade spread-
ing, failed nodes are not removed from the system in our
case. If a long enough equilibration period is applied be-
fore measuring the system behavior, the initial fragility
values fi(0) are of little importance (see Sect. 3.5 for a
detailed discussion). Unless stated otherwise, we set them
randomly in the range (0, 1) in our simulations.
According to the rules above, when n neighbors of
node i fail, node i resists with the probability (1 − fi)n
and fails with the complementary probability
PF (fi, n) = 1− (1− fi)n . (3)
This response to failures is “path-independent” in some
sense: the probability that a node resists n failures of its
neighbors, (1− fi)n, is the same as the probability of re-
sisting two consequent waves of failures of x and n − x
neighboring nodes, (1− fi)x(1− fi)n−x.
We simplify the system by assuming that interactions
of all nodes are equally strong (the general case will be
studied in Sect. 3.4). This renders the notion of “node’s
neighbors” superﬂuous because every failure aﬀects all re-
maining healthy nodes in the system. Now assume that
after the initial failed node is chosen, n1 nodes respond to
this failure and fail too. Each of the remaining N−n0−n1
nodes (here n0 = 1 is the initial number of failed nodes)
then has some n1-dependent failure probability which re-
sults in n2 new failures, and so on, until in iteration m,
nm = 0 is achieved. The cascade size is then deﬁned as
the total number of failures, S = n0 + . . .+ nm, and node
fragilities are consequently updated according to equa-
tion (2). Since in one turn nodes can only fail once, cascade
sizes are limited by the system size and S ≤ N .
The dynamics of the system, based on failure propaga-
tion and fragility updating, is fully contained in the three
above-described rules. In the following paragraphs we shall
study when these rules drive the system to a critical state
and what is the distribution of cascade sizes P (S).
3.1 Failure probability
Let PF be the average failure probability of a given node
in one time step (or, equivalently, the average fraction
of failed nodes in one time step). Assuming that teq is
some suﬃciently long equilibration time (we use teq =
104 for all our simulations), later fragility values averaged
over realizations, 〈fi〉, do not evolve anymore. All nodes
interact equally strongly, hence 〈fi〉 is independent of i
and it can be replaced with 〈f〉. Since in a large number
of time steps T each node undergoes PF T failures and
(1− PF )T non-failures, equation (2) implies
〈f (teq + T )〉 = 〈f (teq)〉λPF T (1 + β)(1−PF )T . (4)
Using the equilibrium condition 〈f(teq + T )〉 = 〈f(teq)〉,
we can solve this equation with respect to PF to get
PF (β, λ) = − ln(1 + β)
ln λ1+β
. (5)
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Fig. 2. (Color online) Average failure probability: PF given
by equation (5) (solid black line), PF ≈ −β/ lnλ (dashed blue
line) and numerical results (symbols, averaged over 106 time
steps) for N = 103, λ = 0.1. The vertical dotted line indicates
β0 given by equation (6).
When β  1, this can be approximated with PF (β, λ) ≈
−β/ lnλ (Fig. 2 compares these results with numerical
simulations).
A node may fail because it is selected as the ﬁrst failed
node (with probability 1/N) or due to failure propagation
(with probability PP ); PF thus can be written as PF =
1/N+PP . Since the value of PF depends solely on β and λ,
PP = PF −1/N may be negative for a small system which
is, of course, impossible in practice. This situation occurs
when for given λ,N , the value of β is smaller than a certain
threshold β0 and hence it does not suﬃce to compensate
for the fragility decay due to λ. Equation (4) then has only
the trivial solution 〈f〉 = 0 and hence PF (β, λ) = 1/N
(failures do not spread). When β is small, the approximate
form of PF can be used to solve this equation with respect
to β and we get
β0 ≈ − lnλ
N
(6)
which agrees with numerical simulations (see the vertical
line in Fig. 2). Note that if the number of initial failed
nodes is assumed to grow with the system size as wN
(w  1), we get β0 ≈ −w lnλ which is independent of N .
When model parameters are set to extreme values (for
example, N = 103, β = 103, λ = 10−3), the system ex-
hibits unusual modes of behavior where active turns (with
nearly all nodes failed) alternate with calm turns (with
nearly all nodes healthy). While equation (5) holds also
in such conditions, our further analysis focuses on β  1
which renders more realistic behavior.
3.2 Average fragility
When nfi  1, PF given by equation (3) can be approxi-
mated as PF (fi, n) ≈ nfi which can be interpreted as in-
dependence of stress inﬂicted by n individual failed nodes.
This further means that each failed node has its failing de-
scendants independently of other failed nodes and hence
one can use the theory of branching processes [29] to de-
scribe the cascade spreading. Note that by use of this
theory we implicitly assume that the system size is in-
ﬁnite. For a discussion of the ﬁnite-size eﬀects on the size
of an epidemic outbreak see [30].
As already mentioned, when interactions of all nodes
are equal, 〈fi〉 is independent of i. If we further ne-
glect ﬂuctuations of fi, then all nodes have identical
fragility 〈f〉. This is a mean-ﬁeld-like approximation which
replaces the exact cascade spreading with cascade spread-
ing in a homogeneous averaged medium. Since the number
of direct descendants now follows a simple binomial distri-
bution with mean N〈f〉, we can use elementary results of
branching process theory to express the average cascade
size (the total progeny) as 〈S〉 = 1/(1 − N〈f〉). Further,
using 〈S〉 = NPF (β, λ) we obtain the average fragility
〈f〉 = 1
N
(
1− ln [(1 + β)/λ]
N ln(1 + β)
)
. (7)
Since β > 0 and λ < 1, 〈f〉 is always less than 1/N . Com-
parison with numerical simulations (not shown) conﬁrms
that equation (7) is valid only for β  1.
3.3 Cascade size distribution
The theory of branching processes is well studied [31] and
can be easily applied to our model. According to a theo-
rem from [32], if the generating function for the number
of direct descendants d is π(x), the total progeny of the
resulting branching process Y has the distribution
P (Y |n0) = n0
Y
p
(Y )
Y−n0 (8)
where p(b)a is deﬁned using
[π(x)]b = p(b)0 + p
(b)
1 x + . . . (9)
and n0 is the number of ancestors (in our case, the number
of initial failed nodes). Since d obeys a binomial distribu-
tion, its generating function is π(x) = (1 − 〈f〉 + 〈f〉x)N
and we get
P (S|β, λ) = 1
S
(
NS
S − 1
)
〈f〉S−1 (1− 〈f〉)NS−S+1 (10)
where we used n0 = 1 and 〈f〉 is given by equation (7).
Note that the resulting probability is positive for S > N
which contradicts the model assumptions (each node fails
at most once in a given turn). This is a direct consequence
of using the theory of branching processes which assumes
that the system size is inﬁnite. This problem is of little
importance for small values of β when the obtained values
of P (S) are negligible for S > N .
When 1  S  N , equation (10) can be approxi-
mated with
P (S|β, λ) = (N〈f〉)
S−1eS(1−N〈f〉)√
2πS3/2
. (11)
According to equation (7), limN→∞N〈f〉 = 1 for any
given β, λ and hence in the limit of large system size is
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Fig. 3. (Color online) The cascade size distribution: numer-
ical results (color lines), analytical results according to equa-
tion (10) (dashed lines) and the power-law decay with expo-
nent −3/2 (thick solid line) for N = 104, λ = 0.1, 107 time
steps, and β = 0.001 (red line, fastest decay), β = 0.01 (green
line, medium decay), β = 0.1 (blue line, slowest decay). The
analytical solution is not plotted for β = 0.1 because it is very
similar to that for β = 0.01.
P (S|β, λ) ∼ S−3/2 which corresponds to the classical crit-
ical branching process. For a ﬁnite system, the smaller the
value of β, the larger the value of 1−N〈f〉. Consequently,
the power-law scaling holds only for S  βN (this agrees
with Fig. 3 where for β = 10−3, the power-law behavior
disappears at S ≈ 10). On the other hand, the range of β
and λ for which the system self-organizes to a critical state
is wide and we can say that this is an SOC system.
A comparison of the obtained analytical results with
numerical simulations is shown in Figure 3. The agree-
ment is good for small values of β (β  0.01) and the
initial slope of the distributions (before the ﬁnite-size ef-
fects become apparent) is close to −3/2. Results obtained
with β = 0.001 conﬁrm that when β is small enough,
P (S) decays faster than as a power law. When β is large,
true P (S) deviates from the analytical prediction and ex-
hibits a secondary maximum at a large size value – this
eﬀect is well visible in Figure 3 for β = 0.1. This maxi-
mum, formally simply a super-critical phase of the model,
resembles so-called meaningful outliers discussed in [33].
To estimate the value of β at which the secondary max-
imum appears and equation (10) ceases to hold, we take
the average number of failures computed both from equa-
tion (10) and from equation (5). By comparing the two
results we obtain
NPF (β, λ) =
N∑
S=1
SP (S|β, λ). (12)
When β is small, both sides of this equation depend on β
and the equality can hold. However, equation (11) shows
that when β is suﬃciently large, the size distribution is
approximately power-law and it is independent of β. As
we increase β further, the power-law distribution does not
suﬃce to provide enough failures and for equation (12)
to hold, an additional contribution must appear on the
rights side. The value β1 when this happens can be found
by substituting P (S) ∼ S−3/2 on the right side and
approximating the summation with integration. When N
is large, we obtain
β1 ≈ −
(
2
πN
)1/2
lnλ (13)
which complements the previously found threshold β0. For
N = 104 and λ = 0.1, we obtain β1 ≈ 0.02 which agrees
with our empirical observation (β  0.01 for Eq. (10) to
hold) above.
Finally, by comparing the empirical observations pre-
sented in Figure 1 with the obtained analytical results, we
can conclude that the presented model exhibits qualitative
agreement with the studied real system.
3.4 Generalizations
To test how robust are the obtained results, we consider
simple generalizations of the proposed model. First of all,
when the multiplicative fragility update rule equation (2)
is replaced by an additive one, the behavior of the system
does not change considerably. The second generalization
relates to the assumed even inﬂuence of a node’s failure on
all the remaining nodes. Denoting the strength of failure
propagation from node i to node j as Ci,j , the probability
that node j fails as a result of i’s failure can be generalized
to Ci,jfj. The probability that node j fails as a result
of a group F of failed nodes (given by Eq. (3) before)
generalizes to the form
PF (fj ,F) = 1−
∏
i∈F
(1− Ci,jfj) . (14)
Matrix C encodes the structure of the network of node
interactions.
When the elements Ci,j are drawn independently from
a given distribution and the system size is large, the mean-
ﬁeld approximation is again appropriate to describe the
system behavior and the power-law size distribution with
exponent 3/2 results. Similarly when C contains a block
structure with inter-block elements drawn from a diﬀer-
ent distribution than intra-block elements (this mimics the
sector structure of the stock correlation matrix [26,34]),
the original power-law size distribution remains largely
unchanged (unless either the block division of C or one of
the two probabilistic distributions are such that they do
not allow to use the mean-ﬁeld approximation). Analogous
behavior results from the “random neighbor approxima-
tion” in which node’s neighbors are chosen anew repeat-
edly (see [35] for this kind of analysis of a diﬀerent model).
When all elements Ci,j are either zero or one, matrix C
can be represented by a network and a complex topology
of node interactions can be introduced by network mod-
els [36]. We studied two diﬀerent types of networks: the
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network where Ci,j = 1 with probability p
and Ci,j = 0 otherwise and the growing Baraba´si-Albert
network where each new node is attached to I old nodes.
(These two kinds of networks are structurally very dis-
tinct as the former consists of nodes of approximately
96 The European Physical Journal B
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Fig. 4. (Color online) The cascade size distribution on com-
plex networks: (a) sparse Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with p =
5 × 10−5, 10−4, 10−3; the indicative thick line has slope 1.5,
(b) Baraba´si-Albert networks with I = 1 and I = 10; the in-
dicative thick line has slope 1.65). Parameters of the system:
N = 104, β = 0.005, λ = 0.1, 107 time steps.
identical degree and the latter exhibits a power-law de-
gree distribution). Numerical results for both cases are
shown in Figure 4. As expected, for the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi net-
work with p > 1/N , the size distribution exponent re-
mains unchanged. When p < 1/N , the network consists
of small isolated components and hence big cascades can-
not occur. The irregular size distribution P (S) observed
for β = 5 × 10−5 is due to topological properties of the
particular network realization where the model was simu-
lated (i.e., positions of respective ups and downs of the size
distribution depend on the network realization). These re-
sults agree with a previous study of the sandpile dynam-
ics [37] (see [38] for an extensive recent review of critical
phenomena in complex networks). By contrast, Baraba´si-
Albert networks yield cascade size distributions with sig-
niﬁcantly higher exponents (approximately 1.65) which
is probably due to strong inhomogeneity of the network.
When I = 1, P (S) deviates from a power law, probably
as a consequence of the scale-free network topology (the
same shape of the distribution is observed for diﬀerent
realizations of the network).
3.5 Role of the initial fragility values
While it sounds plausible that due to model’s stochastic-
ity, the initial fragility values have no inﬂuence on the
equilibrium fragility distribution, the situation is in fact
0
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Fig. 5. (Color online) Fragility distributions at diﬀerent time
steps (the initial fragility values are set to 1/N , N = 104,
β = 0.001, λ = 0.1).
more complicated. For example, a simple numerical sim-
ulation with fi(0) = 1/N for all i shows a case where:
(i) no stationary fragility distribution arises; (ii) at any
time step, only a small number of distinct fragility val-
ues is observed (see Fig. 5). What causes the discreteness
of fragility values? Denoting the number of failing and
healthy time steps of node i as Fi and Hi, respectively, it
must hold that Fi + Hi = t where t is the current time
step. This node’s fragility now can be written as
fi(t) = fi(0)(1 + β)t [λ/(1 + β)]
Fi . (15)
When all fi(0) are identical, the possible values of fi(t)
are discrete at any time step t and the ratio of neighbor-
ing possible values is (1 + β)/λ. If λ is small (as it is in
our simulations), this ratio is large and hence the num-
ber of actually observed fragility values is small (because
values much smaller or greater than the average fragility
are unlikely). Equation (15) implies that possible fragility
values depend on t and hence there can be no stationary
fragility distribution – this is conﬁrmed by Figure 5 where
fragility peaks constantly shift to higher values and change
their relative heights. Interestingly, even this peculiar set-
ting of fi(0) does not alter the long-term model’s behavior
substantially and the aggregate quantities (such as the av-
erage failure probability or the cascade size distribution)
are similar to those found for randomized initial fragility
values before.
Diﬀerences between neighboring peaks are λ/(1 + β),
hence the time after which the fragility distribution pat-
tern repeats can be estimated as ln[λ/(1 + β)]/ ln(1 + β).
Since this is a typical time of fragility evolution, one
can use it also as an estimate of the initial equilibration
time Teq. For the smallest value of β in our simulations
(β = 0.005) we obtain Teq ≈ 4600 which ex post con-
ﬁrms our setting of the equilibration time to 104. Finally,
note that while the random setting of fi(0) prevents dis-
crete fragility values from appearing, some remnants of the
initial fragility values can be preserved by equation (15).
To obtain a fragility distribution truly independent of the
initial values, one has to assume annealed dynamics, i.e.
fragility updating by randomized values of β and λ.
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Fig. 6. (Color online) Cascade size distribution for the modi-
ﬁed model: numerical results for β = 0.01, λ = 0.1, N = 104,
107 time steps, and various values of α.
4 Generalized model with partial memory
Fragility updating rules deﬁned by equation (2) imply that
nodes become more robust after a failure and hence au-
tocorrelation of their failures as well as autocorrelation of
the total number of failures are negative (their magnitudes
depend on β and λ). As discussed in Section 2, this is true
for majority of stocks but certainly not for all of them.
To allow for repeatedly failing stocks, we introduce the
probability α with which a failed node stays failed also in
the next time step (and consequently acts as an additional
initial failed node). This probability has the role of par-
tial memory in the system and, as we shall see, gives rise
to volatility clustering and other eﬀects observed in real
ﬁnancial data. Note that memory or delayed stress propa-
gation are quite often part of cascade spreading models as
in, for example, [39]. We assume that fragilities of nodes
which stay failed due to α are not updated in the given
time step (when α is small, this assumption has little in-
ﬂuence on the results).
Since P (F )  1, the probability of a node’s repeated
failure is now P (F |F ) ≈ α which, in combination with
the empirical results presented in Section 2, motivates
us to set α = 0.04. We further choose β = 0.01 and
λ = 0.1 which best correspond to the critical regime
in Figure 3. Using this setting we numerically obtain
conditional probabilities consistent with those observed
in the empirical data: P (F |F ) = 0.041 (empirical value
is 0.039), P (F ) = 0.004 (empirical value is 0.003) and
P (F |N) = 0.004 (empirical value is 0.003). As long as
we stay in the critical regime, these values depend on β
and λ weakly. Presence of volatility clustering is conﬁrmed
by signiﬁcantly positive autocorrelation of the number
of failures C(nF (t), nF (t + 1)) ≈ 0.3 (empirical value
is 0.15). The precise value depends on α and λ (and much
less on β) but positive autocorrelation naturally arises
for α which is large enough. By contrast, α = 0 yields
P (F |F ) ≈ P (F ) and C(nF (t), nF (t + 1)) ≈ −0.04. Fi-
nally, Figure 6 shows P (S) for diﬀerent values of α. We
see that for small values of α, the size distribution re-
mains power-law with exponent gradually decreasing as
α grows. Due to the additional complexity introduced by
partial memory, an analytical cascade size distribution for
this generalized model has not been obtained yet.
5 Discussion
We studied empirical stock prices and found that large
simultaneous downturns follow a broad distribution con-
sistent with a power law with exponent 2.19 ± 0.05. To
reproduce this behavior, we proposed a minimal stochas-
tic model of failure propagation. Using a mean ﬁeld ap-
proximation and branching process theory we derived the
general cascade size distribution and determined the range
of parameters which give rises to the critical regime. To
reproduce other features observed in ﬁnancial data, such
as volatility clustering, partial memory was introduced
within the basic model.
While our model implicitly assumes arrival of news to
the market (they cause the initial nodes to fail and allow
cascades to be created), we minimize the inﬂuence of news
on the system’s behavior by assuming their equal impact
(in each time step, exactly one initial node is chosen to
fail). This approach is motivated by the extensive study
of excess volatility which shows that it is diﬃcult to link
the observed trading volumes and volatility to the arriving
information [40] and even the large crash of 1987 does not
seem to be triggered by particular news [41]. In reality,
of course, the impact of news on the market diﬀers from
one day to another. It could be therefore interesting to
test how diﬀerent ways of choosing the initial failed nodes
inﬂuence the model’s behavior (for example, the number
of the initial nodes can be random or network hubs may
be preferentially chosen to trigger a cascade).
There is a number of other challenging questions which
deserve further investigation. Firstly, since the cascade
sizes corresponding to the secondary maximum in Fig-
ure 3 are comparable with system size, this behavior can-
not be described within the formalism of branching pro-
cesses where an inﬁnite system size is assumed. While we
found an approximate condition for the appearance of the
secondary maximum, how to proceed further towards an
exhaustive description of the resulting size distribution is
still an open question. Secondly, it would be interesting
to ﬁnd an analytical expression for the size distribution
exponent in scale-free networks where it appears to dif-
fer from the mean-ﬁeld value 3/2. Thirdly, generalized
model with “partial memory”, studied only numerically
here, calls for analytical approaches. Fourthly, it would be
interesting to know whether the model can be modiﬁed
to produce power-law size distributions with exponents
considerably higher than those reported here. One oppor-
tunity for such a generalization is to assume a dynamic
network structure whose evolution depends on nodes’ fail-
ures, similarly to the approach used in [42,43] for diﬀerent
models. Alternatively, as a generalization of the current
binary model where nodes are either healthy or failed, one
could deﬁne a multi or continuous-state model in which
the probability of following a neighbor’s failure depends
on the failure’s magnitude.
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We stress that the probabilistic spreading mechanism
proposed here is a general one and its use is not limited to
market crashes or ﬁrm bankruptcies. For example, eco-
nomic exchanges between countries are so intense that
decline in one country may propagate to a neighboring
one (take, for example, how growth in many European
countries depends on spending of German consumers). On
a two or three dimensional lattice, a similar mechanism
might be employed to model earthquakes because, simi-
larly to the proposed model, a failure at one place of the
Earth’s crust exerts some stress on its neighborhood (the
number of failed nodes would then represent the earth-
quake size). In summary, the proposed model, together
with its generalizations, has proven to be simple yet rich
in behavior. It poses a variety of new research questions
and we are looking forward to its future development and
applications.
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